
Business Email Compromise in China Sourcing: How Payment Redirection Fraud Works
The supplier's email gets hacked, the "new bank details" arrive, and your deposit goes to a fraudster. How payment-redirection fraud works and the checks that stop it.
The single most profitable fraud in China sourcing does not need a fake factory, a fake product or a fake shipment. It needs one compromised email account and one convincing message: we changed banks β please pay to this new account. The buyer, mid-order and trusting a thread that has run for weeks, wires the deposit to a beneficiary who is not the supplier. By the time anyone notices, the money has been split and moved through several accounts, and it is effectively gone. Business email compromise and payment-redirection fraud are cheap to run, hard to reverse, and almost entirely avoidable β provided you treat every change of bank details as a threat until proven otherwise, no matter how routine the email looks or how perfectly it matches the thread. The scheme works precisely because nothing about it looks like a scam at the point of payment: the factory is real, the order is real, and only the account number has been swapped.
How payment redirection actually works
The fraud has two stages. First, the attacker compromises an email account β the supplier's, the buyer's, or sometimes an employee's on either side β by phishing for credentials, exploiting a weak or reused password, or silently reading a mailbox they have already breached. Once inside, the attacker watches the deal unfold: the names, the amounts, the shipment dates and the payment timeline. They wait for the moment a deposit or balance payment is due. Second, they strike. An email arrives from a lookalike address or from the real, compromised mailbox, explaining that the company has opened a new bank account or changed its receiving bank, often with a plausible reason β an audit, a bank merger, a tax issue with the old account β and a note that the new details must be used today to hold the production slot or secure the vessel. Sometimes the fraudster even forwards the earlier, genuine emails first so the change feels like a continuation of a real conversation. The signature is urgency: it is engineered to make you wire before you verify, and every hour you spend waiting works in the fraudster's favour. The attacker may also monitor replies, answer in the supplier's tone, and suppress the real supplier's messages so that no one corrects the record before the money moves.
Why the deposit is usually gone once it is wired
A wire transfer moves fast, and so does the fraudster. The funds are often split and moved through several accounts β frequently in different cities or abroad β within hours of arrival, and once they leave the beneficiary account, tracing and freezing them becomes an expensive race against time that most buyers do not win. Chinese law does characterise this conduct as fraud: Article 266 of the Criminal Law criminalises defrauding another of property, and telecom and online fraud (η΅δΏ‘η½η»θ―ιͺ) is an explicit enforcement priority, supported by the Anti-Telecom and Online Fraud Law that took effect on 2022-12-01. But it is important to be honest about what that means. A criminal case is a prosecution, not a refund; it does not promise recovery of your deposit, and in practice recovery depends on the account being frozen quickly after discovery and on the funds still being there when the freeze lands. That is why prevention, not prosecution, is where your protection actually lives β the law can punish the thief, but only your own payment discipline can keep the money from leaving in the first place. In practical terms, treat a redirected wire as lost the moment it is sent, and build your process around never letting a fake instruction reach your bank.
The checks that stop a redirection
- Confirm any change through a second channel on a number you already know. If the change arrived by email, call the contact you have used since the start β a number from your earlier calls or the contract, not one printed inside the new email β and ask them to confirm the new details aloud, word by word.
- Require the beneficiary name to exactly match the supplier's registered company name, character for character. A personal account, a different company name, or a trading partner is a refusal point, no matter how the sender explains it.
- Verify the company on gsxt.gov.cn before paying, and make sure the bank account sits with the entity named on the invoice and the contract β the registered name, not a trading name or an English abbreviation β and that the bank's location matches the country of the supplier's registration.
- Never act on an email-only change. If you cannot reach a live person you recognise on a known number, do not send the wire that day; a genuine supplier can wait a day for a large payment.
- Send a small test payment first, or confirm the account details in writing with the supplier's signatory, before sending the full deposit β and keep a dated record of the confirmation and the person who gave it. If the supplier resists a test payment or a written confirmation, that resistance is itself a red flag.
Before you wire a deposit, ask one question: does the beneficiary name on the payment instruction match the registered company name of the supplier, exactly? Fraudsters rely on buyers who check the amount and the account number but never the name β and the name mismatch is the clearest, cheapest signal that the money is going somewhere else. If the names differ by even one character, stop the payment and restart the verification from a known number.
Payment-redirection fraud succeeds because it arrives inside a conversation you already trust, wearing the language of the deal and the email address of the person you have been negotiating with for months. The defence is not vigilance in general but a rule in particular: no change of bank details is real until you have confirmed it on a known number and matched the beneficiary name to the registered company, and no amount of urgency changes that. Make the rule visible to your whole team, because the fraud targets the person holding the payment run, not just the person holding the negotiation. For the wider question of whether the account you are paying is the supplier's at all, see our guide to verifying a Chinese supplier's bank account. This content is general information and not legal advice; for a specific fraud or loss, report to your bank immediately and seek professional legal assistance in the relevant jurisdiction.
Related guides
Your Chinese Supplier Wants More Money Before Shipping: Extortion, Variation Orders and How to Respond
Read βNever Pay a Third-Party Bank Account: How Name-Mismatch Payment Fraud Works
Read βKickbacks and Procurement Fraud in China: What the Law Says When Your Buyer Is on the Supplier's Payroll
Read βVerify a supplier now
Run due diligence on a Chinese supplier before you pay.
